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IMPACT OF FEDERAL TAXATION
The Hardenbergh Case which Mr. Sneed has mentioned is a case differentiating between renunciation of legacies and renunciation of an intestate's
succession. It is a case in which it seems to me that a court, the Tax Court
originally, fell into a trap, into a difficulty which a sense of judicial responsibility
should have avoided. It was faced, perhaps as I read between the lines of its
opinion, with a decision of a Court of Appeals with which it disagreed, in the
case of Brown v. Routzahn. Instead of facing that disagreement, it turned
to this quite specious difference between vesting subject to divesting and not
vesting at all. Now indeed it is almost inconceivable that any rational person
could have felt that this had any function to perform with respect to the
federal gift tax statute, whether the legatee or heir should or should not pay a
gift tax. But the Tax Court adopted it; it was affirmed by a different Court
of Appeals, and the tax differences are now such as to move the states to eliminate
at best a meaningless differentiation. Whether this should move the states or
whether it just differentiates the states seems to me not particularly significant.
'All I am saying is that with the difference turning on perhaps a bit of
terminology, and not much more than that in state law, it is certainly something
that a conscientious court might have turned away from.
When I say courts I should broaden the responsibility, because it is the
responsibility of lawyers as well. I take it that it is the first responsibility
of the lawyers in the Treasury and Department of Justice to administer the
tax law wisely. Their responsibility for winning cases lies within the ambit
of that first responsibility. They present such points to the federal courts, and
in doing so they certainly seem to me to be departing from that wise overall
policy of reconciling uniformity and diversity. I think both of these can be
achieved. We may ultimately want to do away with the diversity. But while
we have it, tax uniformity with diversity of law can be achieved. They do
take restraint and some measure of thought. But I for one don't think that
the achievement is likely to be inconsistent with the call to greatness which
Professor Sneed has mentioned.
DONALD C. LuBIcx*
Dean Hyman, the accident of alphabet makes it rather difficult for me
to add anything to the comments which we have been fortunate to receive from
three of the best and leading scholars in the tax legal field in the country.
However, I perhaps can bring you a message that is even better, since
yesterday my boss, the Secretary of the Treasury, emphasized that next year
we will have both lower taxes and greatness, and the sooner we have them,
the sooner I can get back to Buffalo. We have heard a good deal today about
the distortions of state law by federal tax rules. You may not know that
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in the expense account legislation which Dean Hyman has mentioned, we almost
had a distortion of federal tax law caused by rules of state substantive law.
At one stage the Senate Finance Committee voted to disallow all entertainment expenses except those which a prudent man might incur. After
a raft of editorials and speculation, Congress thought better of that idea and
retreated to the well established federal tax principles of "directly related"
and "associated with," which of course are time honored and clear.
I think Professor Sneed has well illustrated the fact of which many of us
practicing in the tax field have been aware that tax pressures do influence
results both in litigation and legislation in the development of legal rules, and
I think that even if our destiny for this century were not our commitment to
leadership of the free world that this would be true anyway. I think taxes play
such a significnt role in our economy that they are bound to have this effect.
As Professor Blum has pointed out, taxes are not unique in their effect
upon development of private substantive law. Changing social views and
economic pressures of all kinds have always shaped the development of
private law. Anyone; I think, can come up with a number of instances from
the law of torts, contracts or property. The first year law student case of
MacPherson v. Buick dealing with liability of manufacturers in tort, I think,
is an illustration of the impact of changing ideas and changing factors on
the development of private law. Often times familiar rules are distorted to
reach a particular result. Without giving a good bit of thought to it, I
recall my first year class in contracts from Professor Brown where we discussed
the charitable pledge cases where doctrines of consideration were changed and
yielded to pressures to reach a particular desirable result. So I agree largely
with Professor Blum that it is neither undesirable nor unexpected that tax
factors are going significantly to effect the development of our private law;
and I also agree, I think with all of my colleagues here, that the state courts
must follow precedents carefully, studying and applying prior decisions in their
proper context, but after all this is basically the best technique of the common
law process.
And of course where state substantive rights become significant for the
first time, as in the illustrations of the marital deduction cases, and the cases
involving the obligation of support, it is necessary for the courts to think
through and weigh carefully what they are doing. Again this is a phenomenon
which we can observe in many other areas. The influence of labor relations,
I dare say, has had a lot to do with the development of the law of third party
beneficiaries' rights to sue on collective bargaining agreements, and so forth.
Now I am most concerned, of course, at the present time with the legislative role in this process, and I agree that it is important to those engaged
in the legislative process not to pivot a significant tax distinction on insignificant
features of local law or those features which cannot simply bear the strain,
such as making significant tax consequences turn on definition of an obligation
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to support. I do want to say that for those engaged in the legislative process
at the federal level, it is, however, frequently difficult to see these issues clearly
enough, early enough, and I think I ought to defend for Professor Brown the
role of the draftsman in his legislative work. The professional draftsmen on
the Congressional committee staffs are unsung heroes, I think, of the tax
process. They are among the most capable, expert draftsmen that anyone could
ask for to be preparing vital legislation. They operate, however, under very
difficult conditions and pressures not only of time. Decisions are frequently made
by the Congressional committees in rather vague terms. A decision is made
that we ought to disallow entertainment expenses in certain categories, then
it is up to the draftsmen to fill in all of the chinks that have been left open, to
try, as faithfully as they can, to carry out the legislative intent. These men
are dedicated, hard working and excellent craftsmen. I think it is important that
you know that most of the ambiguous drafting that we undoubtedly have in
the Internal Revenue Code is not the fault of the draftsmen.
I would like to say a little bit about the role of the federal tax law in our
economy. I think I would agree wholeheartedly with Professor Brown that
our object is uniformity. We want to allocate the tax burden as fairly as possible among all of our citizens. However, we must recognize that, as Professor
Brown has said, the tax law can really never be neutral. And so I think it
is also desirable that the tax system be used to induce particular desirable
social or economic purposes where those purposes are tied to a broad popular
consensus of what is a desirable social purpose and that it be so used in situations where the tax law can be used appropriately to deal with the problem and
non-tax approaches are not as suitable.
Let me illustrate with a couple of examples. During the consideration of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the trade bill, there was a good deal of
pressure in order to provide tax benefits for industries and firms that were
injured by import competition, and one of the usual tax devices, if you will,
that, it was suggested, would be desirable in this situation is the five-year writeoff of the cost of equipment, or rapid depreciation. Now it seems to me that
this is a situation where there is a desirable social purpose, trying to help
import-injured industries and firms to re-adjust because of the governmental
action of changing tariffs which had allowed them to achieve a certain degree
of prosperity. However, it seems to me that this is a case where the appropriateness of using the tax system is limited. Proper aid to the import-injured
industries calls for a discrimination which it is not possible to achieve through
the tax system. For example, those businesses which were most hurt would be
ones that would be showing losses, and therefore an extra depreciation deduction
would not be of use to them. By granting them across the board, you might
help some, but much of the deductions would have been granted where not
needed. It was not possible to use the tax system in the discriminating way
that would be called for in that situation.
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On the other hand, perhaps the consensus is that the use of a deduction for
contributions to charitable organizations is a useful way to use the tax system
to influence decisions. It may be desirable to encourage private philanthropy
and to avoid close governmental regulation in these areas, and therefore we
may have a situation where the tax law quite properly can be used to induce
the particular result. Now this in turn, this tax policy, has certainly encouraged
the growth of charitable institutions, among them private foundations. Here
is an area where the states ought to respond to a federally tax induced situation to regulate, but the states have abdicated their responsibility. There have
been many cases of abuses of charitable foundations, and because the states
have not exercised control, it may be necessary again for the federal government to step in through changes in the tax system or otherwise.
I would agree finally with Professor Sneed that the economic interests and
pressures generated by the impact of taxation are such that we are always going
to have a vying to induce certain results through changes in the tax law. I
think I have a more optimistic view than he does. By and large I think that in
the end it is all going to work out all right. We have seen a period of a tax
structure with very high rates which has led to many inroads in the tax base
which have produced and created a lot of these distortions about which Professor Sneed has been talking, but I think the atmosphere is such and the consciousness of people in our country today is such that the pendulum is swinging the other way; and I think that now counterpressures have been set in
force which will induce a correction of some of these, the greatest of the distortions and an awareness of the possible effects of the tax law; and I think
that not only in the administrative end of government but in the legislative end
there is a new awareness of the problems requiring careful use of tax policy to
induce or prevent a tax inspired response. I can say again for the Secretary
that we are looking forward next year not only to a rate revision which will
mean a reduction in personal and corporate income taxes from top to bottom
but also a correction of some of the factors which have been productive of
some of the distortion; and hence we may expect toward a greater uniformity of
taxation than we have had in recent years, with more heed paid to the admonitions of Professor Sneed to weigh carefully the reaction which tax action will
induce.

